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INTRODUCTION

Showing your playbook to the opposing coach is unthinkable and
careless, right? Most would think so, but in the context of the modem
adversarial system, it's required. Unlike football, the name of the game in filing
lawsuits is a quick, painless resolution. In other words, get rid of your
quarterback sneaks and let's see who wins. Enter Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(a)-initial disclosure.'

I

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).

363
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) ("initial disclosure") requires
parties to divulge categories of preliminary information to the opposing party
without the opposing party requesting the information.2 This mandatory
exchange saves parties time and money that would otherwise be spent
requesting the information.3 Initial disclosure exists in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure ("Federal Rules") but not in the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure ("West Virginia Rules"). This Note addresses why the Federal Rules
have adopted initial disclosure, why the West Virginia Rules have not,5 and
why West Virginia should now adopt the Federal Rule for initial disclosure.6
Before diving into the debate, this Part of this Note provides a brief
synopsis of the initial disclosure rule and a birds-eye view of some tensions the
rule poses. The brief synopsis serves to familiarize the reader with terminology
and themes that recur throughout this Note.
Part II chronicles the history of the Federal Rules' initial disclosure
provisions and the history of the West Virginia Rules. Beginning with a look at
the opt-in era of initial disclosure, Part II discusses the Federal Rules' transition
to mandatory initial disclosure. Next, Part II explores the West Virginia Rules'
history of tracking the Federal Rules and explains reasons for West Virginia's
deviation from the Federal Rules. The history of both the Federal and West
Virginia Rules serve to bolster the argument for West Virginia's realignment
with the Federal Rules in Part V.
Part III begins by addressing initial disclosure's tensions with the
adversarial system. Tensions with the adversarial system are analyzed and
pitted against the purposes of the initial disclosure-to save parties time and
money. A look at the rule's tensions with the adversarial system and its purpose
of efficiency is reconciled in favor of initial disclosure and thus in favor of
West Virginia's adoption of an initial disclosure rule.
Part IV argues that the purposes from Part III-saving parties time and
money and striving for efficiency-have been achieved in the federal system.
This Part examines studies that have evaluated initial disclosure's effectiveness.
The results of these studies are shown to support initial disclosure's purpose of
efficiency by saving parties time and money. Showing that the initial disclosure
rule's purposes have been achieved should encourage adoption of the rule in
West Virginia.
Part V introduces the survey conducted for this Note and explains the
methods employed to get responses from judges statewide. This Part explains
the state and federal judge questionnaire formats and then discusses and

2

Id.

4

See infra Parts II.B, I.A.

4

See infra Part II.A.

5

See infra Part IIB.
See infra Parts II1-V.

6
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evaluates the responses from each questionnaire. The results of these
questionnaires suggest that the West Virginia Supreme Court should amend the
West Virginia Rules to include initial disclosure modeled after the Federal
Rules.7
Part VI of this Note proposes that West Virginia adopt initial disclosure
based on West Virginia's long history of tracking the Federal Rules, the
prescribed and proven purposes of initial disclosure on the federal and state
level, and what judges across the state have recommended.
In sum, this Note addresses West Virginia's deviation from the Federal
Rules and urges West Virginia to get on board with initial disclosure for three
reasons: initial disclosure has proven its purposes on the federal level,8 West
Virginia has historically followed the Federal Rules,9 and West Virginia judges
recommend adopting initial disclosure.' 0
The InitialDisclosureRule Summarized

A.

Federal Rule 26(a) requires parties to automatically disclose to
opposing parties four categories of information that would normally be
requested from parties during the more expansive discovery process." Without
initial disclosure, parties must request the information they seek. The first
category of required initial disclosures includes names, addresses, and phone
numbers of individuals "likely to have discoverable information ... that the
disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses." 2 Along with listing
each individual likely to have discoverable information, the disclosing party is
also required to describe the subjects of the discoverable information.' The
second category includes a copy or description of all documents and tangible
things that the disclosing party possesses that may support its claims or
defenses.14 The third category includes a "computation of each category of
damages claimed by the disclosing party," including the bases of computation
and "materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered." 5 The
7
8

See infra Appendix 3.
See infra Part IV.

9

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part V.C, E, and F.
"
FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's notes (amended 1993) ("[nitial disclosure]
imposes on parties a duty to disclose . . . certain basic information that is needed in most cases to
prepare for trial or make an informed decision about settlement.").
12
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i).
10

13

Id.

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). To satisfy the second category, only a list needs to be
disclosed and not the listed items themselves. Id.
14
15

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii).
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fourth category includes "any insurance agreement under which an insurance
business may be liable to satisfy all or part of a possible judgment" or to
"indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment." '6
The parties are required to supplement their initial disclosures after the
four categories of information are disclosed if the disclosing party discovers
more information pertinent to the initial disclosure rule or if the disclosing
party's initial disclosures were defective.17 If the above information is not
disclosed, Rule 37 allows the opposing party to compel the disclosures and
impose sanctions.1
B.

A Synopsis ofArguments

The initial disclosure requirement has been lauded for reducing cost
and time because parties do not have to make requests for information pursuant
to Rule 26(a)(1).' However, some critics of initial disclosure have also pointed
out initial disclosure's tensions with the adversarial system. 20 The adversarial
system pits parties against each other, which makes voluntarily divulging
crucial information of one's case grate against the grain of the system.2 1
Supporters of the adversarial system and critics of initial disclosure alike point
out that parties' disclosure of information to opponents undermines the

16

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e).
18
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(A).
19
Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice
Under the 1993 FederalRule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 562-63 (1998) (Eighty percent
of attorneys reported that initial disclosure's intended effects were working. Initial disclosure's
main effect has been saving parties time and money by decreasing "overall litigation expenses,
the time from filing to disposition, the amount of discovery, and the number of discovery
disputes."). The same material presented in the article was presented to the Advisory Committee
in 1997 and published by the Federal Judicial Center, which is cited later in this Note as
17

WILLGING ET AL., infra note 56.

See In re Lotus Dev. Corp. Sec. Litig., 875 F. Supp. 48, 51 (1995) (reconciling Rule 26(a)
with foundations of the adversarial system); Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The
Prospectsfor ProceduralProgress,59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 811 (1993); William W. Schwarzer,
The FederalRules, the Adversary Process,and Discovery Reform, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 703, 714
(1989) ("It can be difficult to explain to clients that damaging evidence has to be disclosed to the
opponent... ."); Carl Tobias, Discovery Reform Redux, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1433, 1435 (1999);
Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 263, 268 (1992).
20

21

See WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 4 (Russell

Sage Foundation 1968) ("[T]he adversary system gives each party the full responsibility and
opportunity to reveal defects in the rival's arguments and proofs."). But see EDMUND MORRIS
MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 3435 (Columbia University Press 1956) (explaining that parties cannot sufficiently prepare their
cases without knowing all pertinent information).
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competition that is supposed to drive the adversarial system.22 For example,
under Rule 26(a), a defense counsel may have to hand over certain information
that could tip-off a plaintiffs counsel to a defense theory it had not yet
prepared for. This debate can be summed up as a battle between efficiency and
the adversarial process, and so far, it seems efficiency is winning. 23
In addition to the adversarial critique, critics question whether the
initial disclosure requirement fulfills its purpose of reducing cost and time
spent toward a case's resolution 24 and whether the rule is needed at all. Critics
who question its purpose argue that initial disclosure does not decrease time
and cost when judges or parties do not adhere to the rule.25 Conversely, when
the rule is enforced, the purpose is fulfilled, so this skepticism seems to be
aimed not at the rule's substance, but at its implementation. 2 6 Critics who attack
initial disclosure tend to argue that discovery reform is wholly unfounded.
Linda S. Mullenix is a leading proponent of this argument, and in 1994, a year
after initial disclosure was adopted into the Federal Rules, she argued that
discovery reform is based on "the pervasive myth of discovery abuse, . . . a

larger myth of American litigiousness, . . . [and] a pervasive belief that has
seized the public consciousness." 27 Mullenix attacked initial disclosure on the
grounds that, at the time, districts could opt out of enforcing it. 2 8 As shown in
Part II of this Note, however, districts no longer have the option of opting out,
and as shown in Part IV, numerous studies continue to report the hazards of
discovery.
II. HISTORY OF THE RULES

The Federal Rules were created in 1938 to unify civil procedure rules
in a time when efficient resolution of disputes was lacking among federal

See Marcus, supra note 20, at 793; cf. Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Characterof Civil
Discovery: A Critique and Proposalsfor Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1302 (1978) ("[I]f
opposing parties and counsel knew before trial what the evidence would be ... they would feel
22

capable of predicting . .. the outcome.").

Willging et al., supra note 19.
AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & THE INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT 7 (2009), available
at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm
&ContentlD-4008 (last visited Sept. 8, 2012) [hereinafter TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT].
25
Id
26
See id.
27
Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery
Abuse and the Consequencesfor Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1396 (1994).
28
Id. at 1444-45.
23

24
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courts. 29 Over twenty years later, the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure
were created for the reasons of uniformity and efficiency. 30 If necessity is the
mother of invention, it seems that uniformity is the mother of both the Federal
Rules and the West Virginia Rules. In the years following the enactment of the
Federal Rules, inefficiencies within the Rules became evident.3 , Prompted by
further need for efficiency, the Federal Rules were amended in 1993 to include
initial disclosure. 32 After the Federal Rules' amendments, West Virginia
decided not to implement initial disclosure. This Part of the Note examines the
Federal Rules' transition toward initial disclosure and West Virginia's
transition from the Federal Rules after the Federal Rules were amended to
include initial disclosure.
A.

FederalRules' History

Before 1938, parties had to beg opposing parties for information
necessary to prepare their cases. For some time before 1938, judges and
litigants alike saw the need for better access to information for the sake of their
cases, 34 for the only formal vehicle for receiving any information from the
opponent was through the pleadings.35 Indeed, this was the only mandatory pretrial process, and the trier of fact had to take what was presented to the court at
face value, as there was no way to ascertain validity.36 This brand of litigation
was coined the "sporting theory" of litigation for the element of surprise that
ultimately led to a type of court-circus where no one knew what to expect.37
Thus, the United States Supreme Court prompted the creation of the Federal

29

See infra Part II.A.

"[The Federal Rules] should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." FED. R. Civ. P. 1. "[The West
Virginia Rules] shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action." W. VA. R. Civ. P. 1.
31
Brazil, supra note 22, at 1332-38.
32
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's notes (amended 1993).
3
See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1947). Supreme Court Justice Murphy
described pre-1938 discovery, saying that "[i]nquiry into the issues and the facts before trial was
narrowly confined and was often cumbersome in method." Id.
34
See Shaw v. Ohio Edison Installation Co., 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 809 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1887).
Writing the opinion, Judge Taft declared that "[tihere is no objection that I know, why each party
should not know the other's case." Id. at 812.
35
Edson R. Sunderland, The Theory and PracticeofPre-TrialProcedure,36 MICH. L. REV.
215, 216 (1937). Sunderland is credited with drafting the discovery provisions of the 1938
Federal Rules. Charles E. Clark, Edson Sunderlandand the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,58
MICH. L. REv. 6 (1959).
30

36

Id.

3

Brazil, supra note 22, at 1301.
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Rules through a mandate for uniform procedures3 8 in 1938 in which parties
could access information necessary to come before the court.39 Doing away
with the "sporting theory" of pre-trial discovery, the drafters of the new rules
envisioned parties exchanging information cooperatively for the sake of a more
efficient process.40
While the 1938 Rules of Civil Procedure were hailed as a mechanism
for encouraging parties to disclose basic issues "to the fullest practicable
extent,"41 the hoped-for self-regulating discovery procedure eventually showed
signs of weakness in the years following the Federal Rules' creation.42 Parties
were not cooperatively disclosing information as the drafters43 of the original
rules had hoped. By the 1980s, new technologies caused an overload of
discoverable material, and lack of cooperation between parties brought
discovery procedure to a gridlock.44 Either parties had too much information to
disclose or parties refused to go through the troubles of discovery altogether.45
Frequent discovery squabbles led to the 1993 adoption of Rule 26(a) initial
disclosure.46
Upon adding initial disclosure to the discovery process' repertoire,
strong opposition to the requirement from some districts led drafters to allow
districts to opt out of adopting it.4 7 These districts had either already passed

In Order of June 3, 1935, 295 U.S. 774, 775 (1935), the Court declared that it would
"undertake the preparation of a unified system of general rules ... so as to secure one form of
civil action." And in 1938 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted. See also 11 B AM.
JURIs. PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE FORMs ANNOTATED 263 (2007) ("One of the purposes of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was to bring about uniformity of basic procedures.").
3
FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's notes (adopted 1937). The Advisory Committee
accounted for many states' differing stances on discovery practices, stating, "While a number of
states permit discovery only from parties or their agents, others either make no distinction
between parties or agents of parties and ordinary witnesses, or authorize the taking of ordinary
depositions, without restriction, from any persons who have knowledge of relevant facts." Id.
40
Brazil, supra note 22, at 1301-03.
41
United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958); see also Greyhound
Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 376 (1961); Brazil, supra note 22, at 1301.
42
Brazil, supra note 22, at 1296-97. Contra Mullenix, supra note 27 (arguing that the notion
that discovery is oft-abused does not rest on sound foundation (i.e., that research tending to show
discovery abuse is not reliable)).
43
See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 357 n.24 (1978).
4
George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System Adapt?, 13
RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. 3, 2007, at 1, 3, 19 (discussing how the advent of computer technology
changed the game of discovery practice).
45
Id.
46
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's notes (amended 1993).
47
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) ("Except as ... otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a
party must, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the parties . . . .").
38
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their own versions of disclosure requirements or were content with the present
system.4 8 As a compromise, the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States ("Advisory
Committee") allowed districts to opt out, yet the Committee "hoped that
developing experience under a variety of disclosure systems would support
eventual refinement of a uniform national disclosure practice." 4 9 In the years
following 1993, many districts opted out-a development that proved to be a
digression from the uniformity the Federal Rules were supposed to progress.so
To address the opting-out problem, the Advisory Committee sponsored
several studies and in turn discerned a widespread need for uniformity among
federal civil procedure regimes.5 1 Another study, conducted four years after
initial disclosure was adopted, reported that forty-nine of ninety-four federal
district courts and seven of fourteen of the largest district courts had adopted
initial disclosure pursuant to the Federal Rules.52 This figure was substantially
less than federal districts' adoptions of other Rule 26 required disclosures. 5 3 For
example, eighty federal districts had adopted Rule 26(a)(2) expert testimony
disclosures and seventy-eight federal districts had adopted Rule 26(a)(3)
pretrial disclosures. 54 Another study, also conducted four years after initial
disclosure was adopted, reported that 58% of attorneys used initial disclosure
pursuant to Rule 26(a) or local provisions.s This study surveyed lawyers and
asked them how discovery practices should be changed to maximize
efficiency.56 The lawyers. that were surveyed ranked adoption of a uniform
national disclosure rule second among proposed rule changes.57 The lawyers
48
The Advisory Committee recognized that "many districts had adopted a variety of
disclosure programs under the aegis of the Civil Justice Reform Act." FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory
committee's notes (amended 2000).
49
Id

so

FED. R. Civ.

51

Id

52

DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUD. CTR., IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN UNITED STATES

P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's notes (amended 2000).

DISTRICT COURTS, WITH SPECIFIC ATTENTION TO COURTS' RESPONSES TO SELECTED AMENDMENTS
To FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26 5-6 (March 30, 1998), available at

http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/FRCP2698.pdf/$File/FRCP2698.pdf (last visited Sept.
8, 2012) (describing and categorizing local regimes).
53
54

ss
56

Id
Id
Willging et al., supra note 19, at 534.
THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUD.

CTR., DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE,

PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE: A CASE-BASED NATIONAL SURVEY OF COUNSEL IN
CLOSED
FEDERAL
CIVIL
CASES
44-45,
(1997)
available
at

http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/discovry.pdf/$file/discovry.pdf (last visited Sept. 8,
2012) (The substance of this article is much of the same material discussed in Willging et al.,
supra note 19.).
57
Id
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noted that they had experienced difficulty in coping with divergent disclosure
practices as they moved from one district to another.18 As a whole, these studies
showed that the initial disclosure rule was not being followed uniformly.59 Yet,
where it was followed, the rule was working as intended-increasing fairness
and reducing costs and delays more often than not.60 In response, the Advisory
Committee recommended three solutions: amending Rule 26(a) by deleting
most of the provisions authorizing local rules, narrowing initial disclosure to
only that information that supports a party's position,61 and exempting
categories of proceedings from initial disclosure requirements-all to establish
"a nationally uniform practice." 62 The Advisory Committee's recommendations
were adopted and became law on December 1, 2000.63 The Advisory
Committee cited both studies6 as reasons why the opt-out option was amended
out of Rule 26.65
B.

West Virginia Rules'History

Before 1960, West Virginia did not have a uniform set of civil
procedure rules and only followed common law rules of procedure.6 6 After the
Federal Rules' enactment in 1938 and before the West Virginia Rules'

58

Id. at 42.

5
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's notes (amended 2000). While the 1993
amendments did not expressly state a need for uniformity among districts, the advisory notes to
the 2000 amendments stated in retrospect, "It was hoped that developing experience under a
variety of disclosure systems would support eventual refinement of a uniform national disclosure
practice." Id.

60

WILLGING ET AL., supra note 56, at 2.

61

A party only has to disclose information that will be used to support its claims or defenses.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A). Because this was added to the initial disclosure rule, the reference to
particularity in pleading in the 1993 amendment was removed. 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2053 (3d ed.

2010).
62
FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's notes (amended 2000).
63
Id.
6
65

Id.
Today, seven states have adopted the federal initial disclosure rule. See ALA. R. Civ. P. 26;

ARIZ. R. CIv. P. 26.1; COLO. R. Civ. P. 26; NEV. R. Civ. P. 16.1; OKLA. STAT. ANN.

§

3226; UTAH

R. Civ. P. 26; WYo. R. Civ. P. 26. This list was compiled by searching every state's rules of civil
procedure to find initial disclosure provisions. This list may be read to update or contradict an
early 2000 study reporting that only three states have adopted the initial disclosure rule as of
2003. See John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the FederalRules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354,
386(2002-2003).
66

See MARLYN E. LUGAR & LEE SILVERSTEIN, W. VA. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Vii-XiV

(The Michie Company 1960).
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enactment in 1960, West Virginia scholars had recognized the deficiencies of
the West Virginia common law rules for procedure as compared to the Federal
Rules. Marlyn E. Lugar, a former professor of law at West Virginia
University, and Charles C. Wise, a former President of the West Virginia State
Bar, recognized that the Federal Rules' "more liberal procedure [had] been
found to be successful in practice" 68 and that West Virginia common law rules
lacked the ability "to arrive at the truth" because "many artificial barriers . . .
becloud ... [and] prevent the attainment of a just solution to a case." 69
Prompted by this outcry, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
designated a Standing Committee on Civil Rules in 1950 to prepare rules in a
way that would comport with "modem and generally accepted standards of
procedure."70
To achieve the goal of modernizing the rules, the drafters of the West
Virginia Rules followed the purposes of the Federal Rules. According to the
drafters of the 1960 West Virginia Rules, the new discovery rules served "(1) to
narrow the issues for trial, (2) to obtain evidence for use at the trial, and (3) . . .
to secure information as to the existence of evidence and how, and from whom,
it may be obtained for use at the trial." 7 The 1960 West Virginia Rules carried
out these purposes, followed the trends of the Federal Rules, and provided a

Id; Lee Silverstein, Should West Virginia Adopt the FederalRules of Civil Procedure?, 1
W. VA. STATE BAR NEWS 195 (July 1953). Lee Silverstein's article was the winner of an essay
contest sponsored by the West Virginia State Bar in 1953 held to stimulate interest in procedural
reform. LUGAR & SILVERSTEIN, supra, at x. In the article, Silverstein argues for West Virginia to
conform to the Federal Rules: "It is well known that the theory of the federal rules is to simplify
and speed up the procedure by eliminating technicalities and encouraging the use of pre-trial
discovery provisions." Silverstein, supra,at 196.
68
Marlyn E. Lugar, Common Law PleadingModified Versus the FederalRules, 52 W. VA. L.
67

REV. 137, 142 (1950).
69

Charles C. Wise, Jr., The Public and the State Bar, 53 W. VA. L. REV. 65, 68 (1950).

70

LUGAR & SILVERSTEIN, supra note 66, at viii.

71

Id. at 215. Today, West Virginia discovery and disclosure rules continue to uphold these

purposes' legacy. See FRANKIN D. CLECKLEY, ROBIN J. DAVIS & LOUIs J. PALMER, JR.,
LITIGATION HANDBOOK ON WEST VIRGINIA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 689-96 (2d ed. 2006).

Without addressing the history of West Virginia Rule 26, former West Virginia Supreme Court
Justice Franklin D. Cleckley and his cohorts state that "the overarching purpose of discovery is to
clarify and narrow the issues in litigations, so as to efficiently resolve disputes." Id. at 689. This
stated purpose comports with the purposes of initial disclosure. See infra Part III.B. These
purposes can also easily be read to comport with initial disclosure's purposes of accelerating "the
exchange of basic information about the case and [eliminating] the paper work involved in
requesting such information" which are discussed in the Advisory Committee notes to the 1993
and 2000 amendments. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a) advisory committee's notes (amended 1993 and
2000).
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uniform system of rules within the state. 72 In 1960, the West Virginia Rules
were created and completely conformed to the Federal Rules.73
Indeed, from 1960 to 1993 the West Virginia Rules were labeled a
spitting image of the Federal Rules. 74 But after initial disclosure was enacted in
1993, West Virginia deviated from the Federal Rules for the first time in over
30 years. Thus, uniformity, the mother of the Federal Rules, has been lost as the
West Virginia Rules have- departed from the Federal Rules. Because the civil
procedure framework still diverges at the state and federal divide," West
Virginia state courts are not required to follow the federal regime, and thus,
they are not required to incorporate initial disclosure in civil proceedings.76
This divide is not unique to West Virginia. According to a study
conducted in 2003 that surveyed states' adherence to the Federal Rules, the
West Virginia Rules complied with just above half of the 1993 amendments.7 7
More generally, the study reported that states are shifting away from
conformity with the Federal Rules and toward localism. 7 8 The trend of the
Federal Rules and states' rules divergence 7 9 suggests a history lesson. If states'
civil procedure rules continue to move away from uniformity, then perhaps a
lesson should be learned from the Federal Rules' history of remedying the
problems that nonuniformity causes.80 Nevertheless, West Virginia is among
the states that began moving away from uniformity after the 1993 amendments
to the Federal Rules.
Realizing the divide between the state and federal regimes, the West
Virginia Supreme Court sought to address the issue and update the West
72

LUGAR & SILVERSTEIN, supra note 66; see CLECKLEY, DAVIS & PALMER, supra note 71, at

689.
73

LUGAR & SILVERSTEIN, supra note 66, at 214-20.

Compare W. VA. R. Civ. P., with FED. R. Civ. P. In a 2002 study comparing states'
74
adherence to the Federal Rules, Professor Oakley labeled West Virginia a replica state before
West Virginia deviated from the Federal Rules in 1993. See Oakley, supra note 65, at 374, 385.
75
Compare W. VA. R. CIv. P. 26, with FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
76
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) ("Except as . .. otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court. . .
Oakley, supra note 65. According to Professor Oakley's study, the West Virginia Rules
7
adopted the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules 11, 16, and 33 (partially); the West Virginia
Rules did not adopt the amendments to rules 4(d), 26(a), and 30. Id.
78
Compare id. at 355, with Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of
Federal Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 757 (1995) (calling the 1938 creation of the Federal
Rules "a triumph of uniformity over localism").
7
See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) advisory committee's notes (amended 2000); Oakley, supra
note 65, at 355.
s0
See supra Part II.A (showing that the lack of uniformity before the inception of the Federal
Rules and after the inception of the initial disclosure rule prompted the Federal Rules' drafters to
mandate uniformity, as the lack of uniformity caused the problems of inefficient resolution, high
costs, and delay).
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Virginia Rules. In 1996, the court appointed a West Virginia Supreme Court
Rules Advisory Committee to study the rules and recommend to the court
whether or not West Virginia should track the Federal Rules verbatim like West
Virginia had done since 1960.82 The committee included Al Emch," who
served as chair on the committee, and Charles DiSalvo,84 who served as vice
chair.85 The committee discussed revisions to the West Virginia Rules,
including a near-total rewrite of certain rules.86
When the committee considered Rule 26, many lawyers on the
committee expressed concern with mimicking the federal initial disclosure
concept. 87 Primarily defendants' lawyers opposed adopting initial disclosure88
and thought that automatic disclosure undermined the adversarial system
because the rule would force lawyers to make strategic decisions before they
had the opportunity to develop the facts. 89 Their concern was that opponent
parties should not divulge information that could expose their weaknesses,
efficiency notwithstanding.9 0 Plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers alike saw the
requirements of disclosing information as a threat to the traditional adversarial
role that could harm their clients.9 1 The lawyers supporting initial disclosure's
adoption expressed the need for uniformity between the Federal Rules and the
West Virginia Rules and the need for efficient resolution of cases. 92 In the face
of a divided constituency, the committee determined that allowing an
experimentation period and not recommending the adoption of the federal
initial disclosure rules would best serve the state.93 Moreover, the committee

Interview with Charles DiSalvo, Woodrow A. Potesta Professor of Law at the West
Virginia University College of Law and the Vice-Chair of the 1998 West Virginia Supreme
Court Rules Advisory Committee, in Morgantown, W. Va. (Nov. 18, 2011).
82
Id
83
Mr. Emch is presently a partner and formerly the CEO of Jackson Kelly, PLLC.
84
Charles DiSalvo, Woodrow A. Potesta Professor of Law at the West Virginia University
College of Law and the Vice-Chair of the 1998 West Virginia Supreme Court Rules Advisory
Committee.
85
Interview with Charles DiSalvo, supra note 81.
86
Id. One rule that was almost completely rewritten was Rule 4. Id.; see Charles DiSalvo,
Filing Is What Counts! How the 1998 Amendments to the West Virginia Civil Rules Will Affect
Your Practice,W. VA. LAWYER, Apr. 1998, at 23 (explaining West Virginia's 1998 amendments
to rules 4-6, 11, 15-16, 23, 26, 30, 32-33, 37, 45, 47, 50, 52(b), 59(b), 59(c), 59(e), 60, 65, and
71 that comply with the Federal Rules to varying degrees).
87
Interview with Charles DiSalvo, supra note 81.
88
Id.
89
Id.; see DiSalvo, supra note 86, at 24, 25.
90
Interview with Charles DiSalvo, supra note 81.
91 DiSalvo, supra note 86, at 25.
81

92

Id

93

Id
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saw the lack of uniformity between federal courts and West Virginia state
courts as an advantage in which two sets of rules could run concurrently-the
Federal Rules requiring disclosure and the West Virginia Rules not requiring
disclosure.94 The committee then recommended revisiting initial disclosure in
later years to see if West Virginia should realign with the Federal Rules. 95
The new West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure came into effect on
April 1, 1998, and have not been amended since.96 The Federal Rules, however,
have been amended several times since 1998.97 Thus, it is time for West
Virginia to revisit the West Virginia Rules and address the widening gap
between the Federal Rules and the West Virginia Rules, especially in regard to
initial disclosure.
III. INITIAL DISCLOSURE'S PURPOSES
Initial disclosure exists to limit discovery and thereby curtail the time
and money spent in the litigation process. 98 Proponents of the rule praise its
effect as a catalyst of cases; 99 critics of the rule scoff at increased costs of
producing information.'0 0 However, the voluntary, anti-competitive nature of
initial disclosure seems at odds with the gamesmanship and partisanship of the
adversarial system. Before delving into how initial disclosure helps the system,
the first Section of this Part discusses whether initial disclosure and the
adversarial system may be compatible.

94
Id. The committee did not account for cases that began in state court and were removed to
federal court. Id. When this happens in a state without initial disclosure, it is likely that the case
will stall so that parties can comply with the federal initial disclosure rules. As such, efficiency
suffers even more.
9
Id.
96
Id. at 23.
9
See FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's notes (amended 2000, 2006, 2007, and 2010).

See infra Parts III.B, IV.A.
9
See generally, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, In Defense of "Automatic Disclosure in
Discovery, " 27 GA. L. REV. 655 (1993) (responding to Griffin Bell's criticism of initial
disclosure and defending initial disclosure's expedient purposes); Tobias, supra note 20, at 144243 (arguing for initial disclosure's effectiveness); Willging et al., supra note 19.
100 See generally, e.g., John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective
Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DuKE L.J. 547, 549 (2010) ("[R]ecent efforts to amend the Federal
Rules . . . have failed to combat the abuses of civil discovery."); Griffin Bell, Automatic
Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1992) ("[Tlhe new rule is
fraught with mischief because ... [it] would require counsel to use his ... talents to discem the
theories of the adversary, then tell the client that, based on counsel's own analysis, harmful as
well as helpful documents must be produced."); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Reforming the New Discovery Rules, 84 GEO. L.J. 61, 84-85 (1995) (explaining that initial
disclosure will not eliminate discovery abuse).
98
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Adversarial Tensions

The initial disclosure rule requires parties to exchange information
automatically.10 1 On one hand, the automatic and unprovoked exchange of
information seems to clash with the traditional adversarial system.102
Traditionally, parties battle toward resolution through the adversarial system.
As Supreme Court Justice Warren Burger forecasted, "[T]rials by the adversary
contest must in time go the way of the ancient trial by battle and blood."' 03 But
the battle toward resolution has never been more costly, nor the weapons more
effective. If the adversarial process pits parties against each other, then it would
seem that the cooperative component of initial disclosure betrays the system.
On the other hand, in the modem adversarial system, the battleground
of the courtroom may seem beyond reach as it is a costly and time-consuming
process.'* Reaching the courtroom may not be necessary to reach a
resolution. 0 5 The tool of initial disclosure increases the likelihood that a case
will be settled before reaching the costly courtroom.106 Moreover, the increased
likelihood of settlement is good for parties because resolving a case through
settlement decreases the possibility of having to pay or be paid too little or too
much. 0 7 In other words, the longer a case drags on, the more the parties will
wish they had settled earlier. 08 As such, the courtroom need not be the only
promise-land of resolution because with initial disclosure, the courtroom

101 Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (not requiring requests for information), with FED. R. CIV. P.

26(b) (requiring requests for information).
102
Bell, supra note 100; DiSalvo, supra note 86, at 25.
103
Warren E. Burger, The State ofJustice, 70 A.B.A. J. 62, 66 (1984).
104 See Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better: The
Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a DigitalAge, 58 DuKE L.J. 889, 892-93 (2009);
Emily C. Gainor, Note, Initial Disclosures and Discovery Reform in the Wake of Plausible
PleadingStandards,52 B.C. L. REV. 1441,1452 (2011).
105 See generally Randall L. Kiser et al., Let's Not Make a Deal: An Empirical Study of
Decision Making in Unsuccessful Settlement Negotiations, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 551

(2008).
106 Willging et al., supra note 19, at 535 (explaining that initial disclosure increases the
likelihood of settlement); see Jonathan D. Glater, Study Finds Settling Is Better than Going to
at
available
Cl,
at
2008,
7,
Aug.
TiMEs,
N.Y.
Trial,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/08/business/08law.html?scp1&sq=cost%2OoP/20not%20sett
ling%20a%201awsuit&st-cse (last visited Sept. 8, 2012) (explaining that plaintiffs who decide to
proceed to trial instead of settling will lose $43,000 on average and defendants who do the same
will lose $1.1 million on average).
107 Kiser et al., supra note 105, at 5667.
108
Id
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battleground drifts away' 09 and thus disproves Justice Burger's bleak
forecast.' 10 "[T]rial by battle and blood""' is replaced with efficiency, which is
more effective in providing opponents with necessary weapons for resolution
that avoid the costly courtroom.
Perhaps the practice of parties voluntarily exchanging information
through initial disclosure is not at odds with the adversarial system.112 On one
hand, if cases are resolved earlier, then perhaps the adversarial game or "sport"
has just been slated earlier, before the courtroom need be reached. Avoiding the
courtroom's scrutiny opens up other arenas for the system to operate, and in
these other arenas, new weapons for adversarial gamesmanship and strategy
can be discovered.'" 3 On the other hand, even if cases do reach the court, the
adversarial system is further enhanced by both parties having pertinent,
relevant information.1 4 This way, the "game" is no longer "trial by ambush"" 5
and becomes trial by truth."' 6 However the adversarial system is defined and
however it may be furthered or inhibited by initial disclosure, the effects that
initial disclosure has had on case-efficiency should outweigh whatever effects it
has had on the adversarial system. As this Note discusses in Parts III.B and

See Patricia Lee Refo, Opening Statement: The Vanishing Trial, 30 LITIG. ONLINE 1,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublishing/litigation joumal/
at
available
04winter openingstatement.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2012).
109

110 See Burger, supranote 103.
'

Id.

Brazil, supra note 22, at 1303-04 ("[The discovery process has] provided attorneys with
new weapons, devices, and incentives for the adversary gamesmanship that discovery was
designed to curtail."). Contra Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double
Play on the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,60 DUKE L.J. 1, 8-9 (2010) ("What some would
call cults of judicial management and alternative dispute resolution have arisen, eroding certain
aspects of the adversary system and blocking access to the courtroom for a trial on the merits.").
113 Aside from normal strategy, "weapons" could include overloading opponents with too
much information.
114
See Sunderland,supra note 35.
115
William W. Schwarzer, Slaying the Monsters of Cost and Delay: Would Disclosure Be
More Effective than Discovery?, 74 JUDICATURE 178, 178 (1991) ("Discovery was intended to
provide each side with all relevant information about the case to help bring about settlement or, if
not, avoid trial by ambush.").
116
Id.; see GLASER, supranote 21, at 7.
In theory, the adversary system motivates both sides to get all the facts. But
the partisans are not required to present all the facts to the court; in practice,
each side is motivated to introduce only the evidence and witnesses that
buttress its own case. While the trier of facts wishes to know everything that
is pertinent, a partisan who discovers harmful information is motivated to
conceal it from the adversary and from the court.
112

Id.
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IV.A, initial disclosure is necessary to promote efficiency and cost reduction,
whether or not it departs from the traditional adversarial process.117
B.

Cost, Delay, and Efficiency

Initial disclosure was incorporated into the Federal Rules to combat
cost and delay in numerous and increasingly complex cases on federal court
dockets.118 Before initial disclosure, some argued that cost and delay ran
rampant through the discovery process where the Federal Rules did not directly
address the potential and actual abuses of discovery devices. 1 9 The drafters of
the 1938 Federal Rules operated under the notion that attorneys would not
abuse the discovery procedures and would instead focus on saving their clients'
time and money.12 0 Critics, however, began to see what was going on behind
the scenes: attorneys were billing clients for increasing amounts of
discovery.121 Unfortunately, many lawyers thought zealous representation
meant taking full advantage of every discovery device offered by the rules,
including those devices that might serve as obstacles to the other party.12 2 This
interpretation resulted in increased delay, cost, and inefficiency.12 3
Prompted by outcry for revision, 124 the Advisory Committee saw initial
disclosure as the solution. The Committee put it explicitly, "[a] major purpose
of the revision is to accelerate the exchange of basic information about the case
and to eliminate the paper work involved in requesting such information, and
note 56, at 2 ("Initial disclosure is being widely used and is
apparently working as intended, increasing fairness and reducing costs and delays far more often
than decreasing fairness or increasing costs and delays.").
118
FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's notes (amended 1983)
("[Before initial disclosure,
discovery practices imposed] costs on an already overburdened system and impede[d] the
fundamental goal of the 'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."').
119
Bell, supra note 100, at 8 ("The authors of the Federal Rules believed that the process
would allow a vast amount of information to be disclosed in a system that would be efficiently
regulated by the attorneys themselves. Unfortunately, discovery under the Federal Rules has
fallen short of these lofty expectations."). Contra Linda S. Mullenix, supra note 27, at 1396 ("We
believe American civil litigation is out of hand because notoriously greedy lawyers engage in
serious discovery abuse-not because they do, but because litigiousness has become linked in
our minds with discovery abuse.").
120
Bell, supra note 100, at 8.
121
Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation:
Enough is Enough, 1981 BYU L. REv. 579, 582 (1981). For a discussion on attorney's unethical
billing practices, see Douglas R. Richmond, For a Few Dollars More: The Perplexing Problem
of Unethical BillingPracticesby Lawyers, 60 S.C. L. REv. 63 (2008-2009).
122
See Bell, supra note 100, at 12.
123
Id at 8.
117

WILLGING ET AL., supra

The Advisory Committee cites several articles and studies in their 1993 and 2000 notes that
pled for discovery reform, including: Brazil, supra note 22; Schwarzer, supra note 20;
124

STIENSTRA, supra note 52; WILLGING ET AL., supra note 56.
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the rule should be applied in a manner to achieve those objectives."l 25 In effect,
initial disclosure bypasses the discovery process to achieve the same goal of
disclosure.12 6 The Advisory Committee reasoned that, with initial disclosure,
expenses incurred and time wasted making routine discovery requests will be
avoided. 12 7 And in the broader sense, the initial disclosure rule was drafted for
the purpose of maximizing efficiency by decreasing discovery disputes. 12 8 As
Part IV of this Note discusses, these purposes have largely been satisfied.
IV. INITIAL DISCLOSURE'S PROVEN PURPOSES
This Part of the Note examines studies that look specifically at whether
or not the purposes outlined in Part III have been satisfied, i.e., whether or not
initial disclosure tends to decrease costs and delay and increase overall
efficiency. The studies show that the purposes for initial disclosure's adoption
into the Federal Rules have largely been satisfied.
A.

Reduction of Cost and Delay

"Time is money."1 2 9 To the dismay of clients, the costs soar in the
discovery process for civil cases, 13 0 and litigation can go on much longer than
expected. 1 The higher the stakes, the longer the case takes. 132 The discovery
process alone can cause parties to settle a case or abandon a cause of action

125
126
127

FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's notes (amended 1993).
See id.
id.

128
Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform
Code of State Civil ProcedureThrough a CollaborativeRule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REV.
1167, 1211 (2005). Before the 1993 amendments, discovery disputes that came before the court
were largely ineffective. This led to more "hide-the-ball" and even more discovery disputes
because attorneys remained undeterred from abusing discovery procedures. Id.; see Brazil, supra
note 22, at 1342.
129
Benjamin Franklin, Advice to a Young Tradesman, in WORKS OF THE LATE DOCTOR
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 188 (P. Wogan et al. eds., 1793).
130
TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 2, 16 ("Discovery [and disclosure] expenses
typically amount to about 3% of the monetary stakes, whether the stakes are large or small.");

Gainor, supra note 104, at 1449; see WILLGING ET AL., supra note 56, at 16.

Dubbed as America's longest civil case at the time, Kemner v. Monsanto Co. lasted three
and a half years. 576 N.E.2d 1146 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), discussed in Michael Tackett, Nation's
Longest Civil Jury Trial Winds Down, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 6, 1987, available at 1987 WLNR
1463578.
132
Willging et al., supra note 19, at 533. ("The stakes in the litigation were positively
correlated with the length of the case: the higher the stakes, the longer the case lasted.").
131
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altogether.13 3 A 1997 study found that half of the total expense of fully
litigating a case goes toward the discovery process.1 34 High costs of trial
preparation are one aspect of what the drafters of the Federal Rules sought to
control with the advent of initial disclosure.135 The Advisory Committee
recommended that the initial disclosure rule should be applied so that the
objective of catalyzing the exchange of necessary information and doing away
with routine paperwork is achieved.' 3 6 This objective was a tall order to change
civil procedure, and despite some complaints,137 the objective has been
satisfied. Since initial disclosure's adoption into the Federal Rules, several
studies have examined initial disclosure's cost-effectiveness, and overall, the
effects have been positive. 3 8
In 1997, the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules asked the
Federal Judicial Committee to research initial disclosure's effectiveness.1 39 The
study focused on attorneys' experiences with initial disclosure at a time when
initial disclosure was a relatively new procedure and little research had been
done on the matter.14 0 It also focused on several aspects of the initial disclosure
rule, such as the rule's cost-effectiveness. In the study, attorneys responded that
initial disclosure decreased litigation expenses, delay throughout the discovery
process, discovery disputes, and the amount of discovery that would typically
be requested or produced without initial disclosure.141 After the automatic
exchange of information, parties no longer need to request that information
through discovery requests.142 Moreover, because the initial disclosure rule
specifies what information needs to be turned over, parties are able to avoid the
effect of broad discovery requests that result in too much information.143
Additionally, the attorneys noted that initial disclosure increased procedural
fairness, the fairness of cases' outcomes, and the likelihood of settlement.14 4

'3
Moss, supra note 104, at 908 (explaining that discovery expenses deny meritorious and
unmeritorious claims alike).
134
Willging et al., supra note 19, at 540, 548 (showing that lawyers spend an average of
$13,000 per client throughout the litigation process which is "fairly close to 50%" of the total
costs of litigation).
'
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's notes (amended 1993).
136
Id.
137
See TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 9.
13
See Willging et al., supra note 19, at 534 ("In general, initial disclosure appears to be
having its intended effects.").
'3
Id. at 526.
4
141
142

Id. at 527-28.

Id. at 535.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).

143

id

1"

See Willging et al., supra note 19, at 535.
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Compared to other discovery devices, initial disclosure costs less.145
Specifically, the study showed the average cost-discrepancies between
discovery devices: depositions cost $35,000, expert disclosure and discovery
cost $1375, document production cost $1100, interrogatories cost $1000, initial
disclosure cost $750, and meeting and conferring cost $600.146 Thus, circa
1997, the cost-effective purpose for which the initial disclosure rule was
initially adopted had been achieved.
The 1997 study also showed some problems with initial disclosure's
implementation. Incomplete disclosures were the primary problem 47 due to
lawyers not appropriately or proportionally following Rule 26(e)
supplementation.148 The study also reported nonuniformity among federal
courts as a problem with initial disclosure, which has since been corrected in
the 2000 amendments to the Federal Rules.149 The source of the problem
appears to have been caused by practitioners' inexperience with the thenrelatively new initial disclosure rule.150
In 2009, the American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on
Discovery and the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System
conducted a study to pinpoint problems with the discovery process and
recommend solutions.' 5 The study reported that the discovery process is too
costly and too often forces settlement due to lack of information; it further
noted that initial disclosure is not carried out pursuant to the rule,152 a
complaint that echoes the earlier studies. According to the study, judges who
neither force parties to disclose per Rule 26(a) nor schedule discovery per Rule
16 cause disclosure problems and forced settlements.' 53 The lacking stringency
145

Id. at 540.
Id. These numbers do not take into account the likelihood that initial disclosure will reduce
the cost of the other discovery devices. However, although initial disclosure may reduce the cost
of other discovery devices, initial disclosures still incur cost. Therefore, depending on the amount
saved compared to the amount spent on initial disclosures, initial disclosure may still add cost
instead of reducing the net cost. As such, it is possible that initial disclosures operate like a zero
sum game, or even yet, it is possible that initial disclosures actually increase net costs.
147
See Willging et al., supranote 19, at 540.
148
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e) (requiring parties to supplement disclosures once a party discovers
new information that was not previously disclosed).
149
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's notes (amended 2000) ("These amendments
restore national uniformity to disclosure practice.").
150
Willging et al., supra note 19, at 579.
's'
TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 1.
152
Id. at 2.
'5
See id.; but see supra notes 107, 144 and accompanying text ("[T]he increased likelihood
of settlement is good for parties because resolving a case through settlement decreases the
possibility of having to pay or be paid too little or too much .... [A]ttorneys noted that initial
disclosure increased . .. the likelihood of settlement.").
146
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of initial disclosure enforcement has led to attorneys' dissatisfaction with initial
disclosure as only thirty-four percent of attorneys agree that initial disclosure
rules reduce discovery and only twenty-eight percent of attorneys agree that
initial disclosure rules reduce costs. 154 The study, therefore, proposes that initial
disclosure practices should be more stringently enforced than current
practices.
To enhance initial disclosure's effectiveness and remedy the reported
widespread dissatisfaction with initial disclosure's implementation, the study
proposes several reforms. The reforms include a shorter time (thirty days)
between filing and initial disclosure, production of items that would otherwise
only be listed, limited discovery after initial disclosure is made, and a
continuing duty to supplement disclosures-the goal primarily being limited
discovery and effective initial disclosure.156 But the study gives little reason
why such reforms would work, which raises questions of the problems the
reforms purport to address. For example, the study gives no reason why
limiting time for initial disclosure decreases costs or cures the threat of forced
settlement.' 57 Conversely, limiting time might even exacerbate the problem,
making it less likely that parties will comply under a time crunch. Moreover,
the study ignores that Federal Rule 26(e) currently imposes a duty on parties to
supplement disclosures. Hence, the study appears to inadequately address the
lack of initial disclosure's enforcement and only discuss reforms that focus on
more stringent rules that may just as likely not be enforced. If the problem of
initial disclosure's effectiveness stems from its lack of enforcement, it would
seem that the proposed reforms should consider more extensive sanctions for
failure to comply with the current rules instead of creating more rules that are
just as likely not to be enforced. Initial disclosure's perceived problems only
exist in its implementation, not in its substance, so reforming its substance may
not address the real problem, and ignoring its value when it is enforced
disserves and disregards the rule's purpose. A little more efficiency is better
than none at all.
Concluding with Efficiency

B.

When implemented, initial disclosure satisfies its primary purpose of
efficient litigation and settlement by saving parties time and money. The
Advisory Committee's comments concerning the 1993 amendments suggest

154
155

TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 24,

at 7.

Id.

Id. at 8.
See Glater, supra note 106 (reporting that settlements reap better rewards for defendants
and plaintiffs than do trials).
156

157
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that initial disclosure's purposes serve to resolve the pangs of litigation.' 8 With
initial disclosure, the Advisory Committee envisioned that parties would have
the tools they needed earlier in their case. With the requisite tools, parties
would be enabled to evaluate their cases' strengths and weaknesses closer to
the outset of litigation. The initial disclosure rule presupposes that the required
information would have been received eventually regardless of the rule, but
only after parties would request or demand the information through discovery.
The automatic component of initial disclosure thus skips the hassle of
requesting information, which encourages settlement and concludes cases
efficiently. When initial disclosure is employed and enforced, 80% of attorneys
agree that initial disclosure has satisfied at least one of the desired effects.159
So, while it may be unlikely that cases actually conclude this early in the game,
if nothing else, the discovery process is shortened, and the end-sum is still more
efficient than it otherwise would have been with longer discovery and no initial

disclosure. 160
What appears to be a win-win for all parties has been met with some
skepticism from the Supreme Court shortly after the rule's creation. Upon the
initial disclosure rule's enactment, Justice Scalia questioned the rule's proposed
efficiency:
But the duty-to-disclose regime does not replace the current,
much-criticized discovery process; rather, it adds a further
layer of discovery. It will likely increase the discovery burdens
on district judges, as parties litigate about . . . whether the
opposing side has adequately disclosed the required
information, and whether it has fulfilled its continuing
obligation to supplement the initial disclosure.
Justice Scalia argued that the effects of initial disclosure would be too
burdensome on parties. However, the information required under the initial
disclosure rule is basic information that would typically be requested through
the discovery process even without the requirement of initial disclosure. Rather
than adding a layer of discovery, it circumvents basic discovery requests.
Moreover, the initial disclosure rule seems to coincide with the Federal Rules

'
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's notes (amended 1993). The initial disclosure
rule was "designed to eliminate certain discovery, help focus the discovery that is needed, and
facilitate preparation for trial or settlement." Id.
159 Compare WILLGING ET AL., supra note 56, at 26 with text accompanying note 154.
160 See Gainor,supra note 104, at 1464.
161 Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 510 (1993) (Scalia,
J.,
dissenting).
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of Civil Procedure's overarching trend of "notice" and "fairness."l 62 In addition
to coinciding with the Federal Rules' overarching purpose-"to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding" 63 initial disclosure's purpose of efficiency has been satisfied summarily through
cost and time reduction.
V. WEST VIRGINIA WANTS INITIAL DISCLOSURE
After over thirty years of emulating the Federal Rules almost verbatim,
West Virginia opted out after initial disclosure came along in 1993.164 Instead
of adopting the new rules, the West Virginia advisory committee recommended
an experimentation period.'65 Because the purposes of initial disclosure under
the Federal Rules appear to have been satisfied 66 and because over a decade
has passed since the last time the West Virginia Rules were amended, it is time
that the West Virginia advisory committee revisits and realigns with the
Federal Rules.
This Part discusses the state-wide survey conducted by the author and
judges' responses to the survey. When the advisory committee revisits the
rules, the judges' responses to the state-wide survey will provide the committee
with a good reason to recommend incorporating initial disclosure provisions
into the West Virginia Rules. As the survey shows, the majority of West
Virginia state judges do not require a form of initial disclosure as it is not
required in West Virginia.16 7 However, those state judges that do require some
form of de facto initial disclosure have noted increased efficiency of caseresolution. That is, when any form of initial disclosure is required, parties
resolve matters more quickly. Federal judges in West Virginia share this
sentiment as well. Federal judges who sat before and after 1993-thereby
presiding over courts with and without initial disclosure-and judges who have
only sat after 1993 praise initial disclosure's effects. Thus, judges in West
Virginia support initial disclosure's amendment into the West Virginia Rules.

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) ("[G]ive the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."); see Gainor, supra note 104; Miller,
supranote 112.
163
FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
162

"
165

See W. VA. R. CIV. P. 26.
See supra Section II.B.

See supra Sections III, IV.
Judges have discretion in planning stages of discovery to effectuate initial disclosure
through West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 16. W. VA. R. CIv. P. 16.
166
167
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A State-Wide Survey

A total of thirty-five randomly selected state and federal judges across
West Virginia were sent and have received questionnaires for this Note. 16 8 Of
the thirty-five judges, fifteen judges responded to questions asking, mainly, if
West Virginia should adopt initial disclosure rules. 9 Of the fifteen judges that
responded, eight are federal judges and seven are state judges. While the
response rate may seem low, the responses show judges' support for initial
disclosure. 170 Moreover, enough data was received so that if any further
examination or inquiry into this Note's topic is conducted, a sound foundation
has been established here.171
Questions addressed to state judges varied slightly from the questions
addressed to federal judges. In both the state and federal judges' questionnaires,
the questions called for judges to give reasons in support of their answers. To
encourage freedom of thought and increase the response rate, judges have been
granted anonymity. Some questions were divided into multiple parts in order to
increase detail and further extract judges' opinions. This technique often
elicited more thorough, detailed answers.
B.

An Overview of the State-Judge Questionnaire

State judges were asked six questions,' 72 the first of which contained
four parts. In the first question, state judges were asked if Rule 26 initial
disclosure or some other form of involuntary disclosure was required in their
court. If the judge answered yes, the judge was then asked if initial disclosure
was required pursuant to a local rule or order. If the judge answered yes again,

168 Questionnaires from Evan Olds, Assoc. Editor, West Virginia Law Review, to Federal and
State Judges in W. Va. (on file with the West Virginia Law Review). Due to resource and time
limitations, attorneys were not sent questionnaires for this Note. See The West Virginia State Bar
County
Breakdown
of
Active
Attorneys,
W.
VA.
ST.
B.,
http://wwww.wvbar.org/shared/content/county%20breakdown_2012-03-21.pdf (last visited Sept.
8, 2012) (reporting that 4,845 attorneys are currently and actively practicing law in West
Virginia).
169 The questionnaire's response rate has been deemed sufficient by James Heiko, Professor of
Empirical Studies at West Virginia University College of Law. Professor Heiko has reviewed the
judges' responses and agrees that judges in West Virginia overwhelmingly seem to support and
recommend that West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure be amended to include provisions for
initial disclosure rules. Interview with Professor James Heiko, Professor of Empirical Studies,
West Virginia University College of Law (Dec. 19, 2011) (on file with author).
170
id.
171 Id. Likewise, further inquiry into attorneys' opinions on initial disclosure could also serve
to support or oppose this Note's thesis.
172 See infra Appendix 1.
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the judge was requested to quote the local rule or order. The judges were then
asked to summarize the court's initial disclosure requirements.
The second question asked the judge what materials parties are
required to disclose pursuant to the court's initial disclosure requirements. The
second question also included an option that allowed the judge to ignore the
question if the first question had already addressed the same matter.
The third question contained three parts. First, the judge was asked to
state whether or not initial disclosure had made litigation more efficient.
Second, the judge was asked to explain why or why not initial disclosure
increased trial efficiency in his or her court. Third, the judge was asked to state
other effects initial disclosure had on his or her cases.
The fourth question also contained three parts. First, the judge was
asked what strengths and weaknesses were evident in initial disclosure rules.
Second, the judge was asked whether or not the West Virginia Rules should be
amended to include provisions for initial disclosure. Third, the judge was asked
to explain why or why not the West Virginia Rules should be amended to
include provisions for initial disclosure.
The fifth question expounded on the fourth question and asked the
judge whether or not the West Virginia Rules should mimic the Federal Rules
if initial disclosure were to be adopted in West Virginia.
The sixth question asked for any additional comments.
EvaluatingState-Judge Responses

C.

The evaluation of the state-judge responses begins by discussing the
responses from judges who require de facto initial disclosure independent from
the absent West Virginia initial disclosure provisions.17 3 The evaluation
discusses the kinds of initial disclosure required by the judges who act
independently from the West Virginia Rules. Next, the responses from judges
who do not require initial disclosure are discussed. For all judges, reasons for
and reasons against West Virginia's adoption of initial disclosure are
addressed. The end of this section provides a conclusion based on the statejudge responses.
Although the West Virginia Rules do not contain a provision requiring
initial disclosure as the Federal Rules do, three of the seven state judges who
responded to the questionnaires require some form of initial disclosure in their
courts and show support for initial disclosure's adoption into the West Virginia
Rules.1 74 The three judges that require initial disclosure do so by local order
and by Rule 16(b)'75 of the West Virginia Rules.17 6 Also pursuant to West

173

See infra Appendix 3.

174

id

17 Rule 16(b) gives a judge discretion to expedite a case's progression by planning the
discovery process:
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Virginia Rule 16(b), one judge requires attorneys to submit a pre-trial memo
that discloses exhibits, names, and addresses of all witnesses to the court and
the opposing party during an early scheduling conference, which is a common
practice of judges.
The three judges explain several strengths of requiring initial
disclosure, such as a decrease in frivolous lawsuits.178 Frivolous lawsuits
decrease because requiring initial disclosure "forces attorneys to conduct a
proper investigation prior to filing [their cases]."l 7 9 Furthermore, initial
disclosure "requires counsel to consider early-on how they will prove their
cause of action."180 Also, the judges state that requiring initial disclosure can
lead to an accelerated discovery process, which in turn leads to quicker case
resolution and decreases the time and money wasted by having parties make
routine discovery requests.'"' As one judge concludes, initial disclosure
requirements expedite serious settlement discussions.' 82
The judges also discuss some of initial disclosure's weaknesses. Some
of the judges discuss weaknesses and strengths that seem to contradict each
other. For example, one judge explains that requiring initial disclosure could
lead to additional work and expense, but the judge also states that requiring
initial disclosure could save parties time and money.'83 This apparent
contradiction may be explained in two ways. First, materials required by initial
disclosure rules may prove futile in some cases but prove useful in other cases.

(b) Scheduling and Planning. Except in categories of actions exempted by the
Supreme Court of Appeals, the judge shall, after consulting with the
attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties, by a scheduling
conference, telephone, mail or other suitable means, enter a scheduling order
that limits the time:
(1) To join other parties and to amend the pleadings;
(2) To file and hear motions; and
(3) To complete discovery.
The scheduling order also may include:
(4) The date or dates for conferences before trial, a final pretrial conference,
and trial; and
(5) Any other matters. appropriate in the circumstances of the case. A
schedule shall not be modified except by leave of the judge.
W. VA. R. Civ. P. 16.
176
Questionnaires from Evan Olds, supra note 168.
177
Id.; see W. VA. R. Civ. P. 16.
178
Questionnaires from Evan Olds, supra note 168.
179

id.

180

Id.

18

Id.

182

id

183

Id.
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Second, initial disclosure may increase an attorney's workload at first, but in
the long run, the disclosure may decrease work and expense. Among other
weaknesses, the judges state that the present form of initial disclosure allowed
by West Virginia Rule 16(b) is not as comprehensive or effective as the initial
disclosure mandated by Federal Rule 26(a).18 4 Granted, these judges may not
have as much hands-on experience with initial disclosure, but as discussed later
in Sections E and F, initial disclosure's strengths listed by these judges cohere
with the same strengths listed by federal judges who have had hands-on
experience with the initial disclosure.
The state-judges who independently require initial disclosure conclude
that when some form of initial disclosure is required on the state level, cases
resolve more efficiently.185 One judge, however, hypothesizes that some
attorneys do not comply with the court's order because West Virginia does not
mirror the federal initial disclosure rule which requires disclosure. 186 This
criticism comports with the weaknesses described above-that West Virginia's
treatment of initial disclosure, as can be read into Rule 16(b),"' is not
altogether as comprehensive or effective as Federal Rule 26(a). Thus, judges
who independently require initial disclosure only see a "somewhat" more
efficient trial process. This same judge then goes on to urge the adoption of
initial disclosure rules pursuant to Federal Rule 26(a), reasoning that attorneys
should investigate their cases before filing suit." Another judge ends the
questionnaire by stating that the West Virginia Rules should "absolutely" be
amended to include provisions for initial disclosure, but suggests that such
provisions should include exemptions "tailored to cases common to state
court."' 8 9 The judge did not provide specific examples of cases that might be
exempted from the reaches of initial disclosure; however, as shown in Section
E of this Part, the United States District Court for the Northern District of West
Virginia enumerates exemptions in its local rules.' 90
State judges that do not independently require initial disclosure are not
uniform in their recommendations for the West Virginia Rules: two judges
support West Virginia adopting initial disclosure provisions, and two judges
oppose.191 The two judges who oppose adopting initial disclosure gave no

184

id

"

Id

185
187

Id.
d

West Virginia Rule 16(b) can be read in a way that gives judges authority to require their
own brand of initial disclosure as they deem appropriate. See W. VA. R. Civ. P. 16; supra note
175 and accompanying text.
188
Questionnaires from Evan Olds, supranote 168.
189

Id.

190

See infra notes 210, 211 and accompanying text.
Questionnaires from Evan Olds, supranote 168.

191
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reasons for their opinion other than saying that "lawyers are busy enough
already following rules. ... [D]iscovery as mandated by current rules is
sufficient."' 92 The two judges who support adopting initial disclosure were
more vocal with their reasons. One judge states that "moving cases along" is
the main strength of initial disclosure and further explains that "parties really
need to be exchanging info as soon as possible to move their cases along."' 93
The same judge states that initial disclosure requirements do not appear to have
weaknesses and adds, "I will consider adding a local rule to make this work." 94
Both judges who support adopting initial disclosure conclude that the West
Virginia rule should mimic Federal Rule 26(a).'9 '
The state-judge responses show an affinity toward implementing initial
disclosure by using their own discretion, by suggesting West Virginia Rules
adopt Federal Rule 26(a), or by both. The three judges that require de facto
initial disclosure independently from the absent West Virginia disclosure
requirements recommend that West Virginia adopt initial disclosure because
they have seen its effects reap efficient results on the state level.' 96 The four
judges that do not independently require initial disclosure are split on the
matter, perhaps because they lack experience with requiring initial
disclosure.197 Judges opposing the adoption offer only one reason while judges
supporting the adoption delve into much more detail. 98 In sum, a total of five
of the seven state-level udges who responded recommend that West Virginia
adopt initial disclosure.l9
D.

An Overview of the Federal-JudgeQuestionnaire

The federal judges were asked seven questions, 200 the first of which
contained two parts. In the first question, federal judges were asked if they
required any other form of involuntary disclosure in their court. If the judge
answered yes, the judge was then asked to describe the additional initial
disclosure requirements.

192

19

id
Id.
id
Id.

196

See id.

193
194

See id. State judges may lack experience with initial disclosure because it is not required by
the West Virginia Rules.
198 id
'

'
200

Id.; see infra Appendix 3.
See infra Appendix 2.
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The second question contained three parts and started by asking
whether or not the judge had worked as a judge before 1993 when initial
disclosure became mandatory. If the judge answered yes, the judge was then
asked if the change resulted in a more efficient or less efficient court. Lastly, as
a catch-all, the judge was asked to describe how the change affected that
judge's court.
The third question contained three parts with an option that gave the
judge an opportunity to ignore it if it had been previously answered. First, the
judge was asked if initial disclosure had made litigation more efficient. Second,
the judge was asked to describe initial disclosure's efficient or inefficient
effects on his or her court. Third, as a catch-all, the judge was asked to explain
any other effects initial disclosure has had on his or her court.
The fourth question contained four parts with the same option to ignore
offered in the third question. First, the judge was asked whether or not litigation
would be more efficient without initial disclosure requirements. Second, the
judge was asked to explain why or why not. Third, the judge was asked
whether or not litigation would be more efficient with more initial disclosure.
Fourth, the judge was asked to explain why or why not again.
The fifth question contained three parts. First, the judge was asked
what strengths and weaknesses were evident in initial disclosure rules. Second,
the judge was asked whether or not the West Virginia Rules should be amended
to include provisions for initial disclosure. Third, the judge was asked to
explain why or why not the West Virginia Rules should be amended to include
provisions for initial disclosure.
The sixth question expounded on the fifth question and asked whether
or not the West Virginia Rules should mimic the Federal Rules if initial
disclosure were to be adopted in West Virginia.
The seventh question asked for any additional comments.
E.

EvaluatingFederal-JudgeResponses

The evaluation of the federal-judge responses begins by reviewing the
responses of judges who sat as judges before 1993. These judges' insights are
particularly valuable because they have presided over courts before and after
initial disclosure's enactment. Next, responses of judges who sat after 1993 are
evaluated and distinguished from those judges who sat before 1993.201 The end
of this Section will provide a conclusion based on the federal-judge
responses.20 2
Of the eight federal judges who responded to the questionnaire, three
began sitting as judges before 1993, the year of initial disclosure's

201

See infra Appendix 3.

202

id
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enactment.203 These three judges agree that the implementation of initial
disclosure results in a more orderly and timely discovery process with less
litigation costs. 2 04 Like state judges, these federal judges applaud initial
disclosure for encouraging parties to concentrate on discovery and trial
-205
preparation earlier.
When asked to list strengths and weaknesses of initial disclosure
requirements, one of the judges who sat before 1993 reflects on the United
States Supreme Court sanctioned advisory committee, "When the rule was
being considered before the Judicial Conference and its Rules of Civil
Procedure Committee, it was felt that this would unduly favor defendants and
disfavor plaintiffs. I'm not sure this has occurred."206 Another judge states that
initial disclosure requirements do not have weaknesses. 2 07 Each of the three
judges agree that initial disclosure requirements work well overall to reduce
litigation costs, avoid discovery disputes, and encourage parties to strategize at
earlier dates.208
When asked if the West Virginia Rules should be amended to include
provisions for initial disclosure, two of the three judges who sat before 1993
agree that West Virginia should adopt initial disclosure. 2 0 9 One of the two
judges who supports West Virginia's adoption of initial disclosure suggests that
the West Virginia Rules be amended to include exemptions 2 10 additional to the

203
204

Questionnaires from Evan Olds, supra note 168.
Id.; see infra Appendix 3.

205

Questionnaires from Evan Olds, supra note 168.

206

id
id
id
id

207
208
209

Id. By local rules, West Virginia's Northern District Court exempts the following cases
from initial disclosure requirements:
(1) habeas corpus cases and motions attacking a federal sentence;
(2) procedures and hearings involving recalcitrant witnesses before federal
courts or grand juries pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826.
(3) actions for injunctive relief,
(4) review of administrative rulings;
(5) Social Security cases;
(6) prisoner petitions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six
Unknown NamedAgents ofFederalBureau ofNarcotics,403 U.S. 388
(1971) in which the plaintiff is unrepresented by counsel;
(7) condemnation actions;
(8) bankruptcy proceedings appealed to this Court;
(9) collection and forfeiture cases in which the United States is plaintiff and
the defendant is unrepresented by counsel;
210

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012

29

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 115, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 15

392

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115

ones listed in Federal Rule 26.211 Only one of the three judges sitting before
1993 remains ambivalent on the matter of West Virginia adopting initial
disclosure pursuant to the Federal Rules.2 12 That judge states that he has no
opinion on the matter, but also states that initial disclosure has been shown to
reduce litigation costs and avoid discovery disputes.213 Thus, the three judges
who sat before 1993 appear to support initial disclosure's implementation,
though in varying degrees.2 14

(10) Freedom of Information Act proceedings;
(11) post-judgment enforcement proceedings and debtor examinations;
(12) enforcement or vacation of arbitration awards;
(13) civil forfeiture actions;
(14) student loan collection cases;
(15) actions that present purely legal issues, require no resolution of factual
issues, and that may be submitted on the pleadings, motions and
memoranda of law;
(16) certain cases involving the assertion of a right under the Constitution of
the United States or a federal statute, if good cause for exemption is shown;
and
(17) such other categories of actions as may be exempted by standing order.
N.D. W. VA. R. 16.0 1(g).
211
Compare N.D. W. Va. R. 16.01(g), with FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B):
(B) Proceedings Exempt from Initial Disclosure. The following proceedings
are exempt from initial disclosure:
(i) an action for review on an administrative record;
(ii) a forfeiture action in rem arising from a federal statute;
(iii) a petition for habeas corpus or any other proceeding to challenge a
criminal conviction or sentence;
(iv) an action brought without an attorney by a person in the custody of the
United States, a state, or a state subdivision;
(v) an action to enforce or quash an administrative summons or subpoena;
(vi) an action by the United States to recover benefit payments;
(vii) an action by the United States to collect on a student loan guaranteed by
the United States;
(viii) a proceeding ancillary to a proceeding in another court; and
(ix) an action to enforce an arbitration award.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B). For a comparative discussion of local rules and the Federal Rules, see
Gerald G. MacDonald, Investigating Alternative Approaches to the Federal Discovery Reform
Initiatives UnderRule 26(a)(1), 36 No. 2 JUDGES. J.4 (1997).
212
Questionnaires from Evan Olds, supranote 168.
213
Id
214
See id; infra Appendix 3; cf Silverstein, supra note 67, at 196 ("In states which have
adopted the federal rules it is reported that bench and bar are very well pleased with them and
that hardly anyone wishes to go back to the old system.").
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The five remaining judges who began sitting as judges after 1993 state
that initial disclosure makes their courts efficient.2 15 The judges reason that
requiring disclosure accelerates discovery without court intervention and forces
lawyers to fairly disclose their evidence. 2 16 As one judge puts it, the free-flow
of information between parties "creates an atmosphere of voluntary disclosure
throughout the discovery period." 2 17 Otherwise, without initial disclosure,
parties are forced to draft and file requests and then wait for responses.21 So,
by using initial disclosure, parties avoid routine discovery requests that cost
time and money which in turn creates an atmosphere of cooperation between
parties-all resulting in greater efficiency.219 Similar to the state-judge
responses, many of the federal judges state that parties having to evaluate and
begin to prepare their cases sooner contribute to initial disclosure's greater
efficiency.220
These same judges unequivocally recommend that the West Virginia
Rules be amended to include initial disclosure provisions identical to Federal
Rule 26(a). 22 1 As one judge states, having a different sets of rules for state
courts discourages and intimidates lawyers from filing in federal courts.222
Other judges explain more generally that having differing sets of rules makes
little sense while having uniform rules provides a valuable consistency. 22 3 The
judges state that the valuable consistency will benefit state courts in the same
ways that increased efficiency has benefitted federal courts.224 However,
another judge points out that if the West Virginia Rules were to be amended to
mimic the Federal Rules' provisions for initial disclosure, other West Virginia
ne
25226
Rules of Civil Procedure may be affected.225 For example, Rule 37 may need
to be amended to provide consequences for failing to disclose documents set
forth in West Virginia's initial disclosure provision.22 7 This may remedy the

215
216
217

Questionnaires from Evan Olds, supra note 168.
id
id

218

See id

219

See id
See id.
See id.
Id

220
221
222

Id.; see supra Part II.B (discussing that the West Virginia Rules were created to comport
with the modem trend of the Federal Rules and had mimicked the Federal Rules for over 60
years before deviating from the Federal Rules).
224
Questionnaires from Evan Olds, supra note 168.
225
Id
226
West Virginia Rule 37 provides sanctions for discovery abuse. W. VA. R. Civ. P. 37.
223

227

Questionnaires from Evan Olds, supra note 168.
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implementation problem discussed in Part IV of this Note. 228Apart from the
subsidiary effects initial disclosure may have on other rules, the consensus
among federal judges who began sitting after 1993 is that West Virginia would
benefit from adopting initial disclosure pursuant to Federal Rule 26(a).229
The federal-judge responses show a strong affinity overall toward the
West Virginia Rules being amended to include initial disclosure.230 With only
one federal judge remaining neutral, seven of eight judges explicitly
recommend initial disclosure's adoption into the West Virginia Rules. ' The
judge that remains neutral sat before 1993 and does not criticize initial
disclosure requirements, but rather praises the effects initial disclosure has on
case resolution.2 32 The remaining five judges who were not sitting before 1993
unequivocally recommend that West Virginia adopt initial disclosure pursuant
to the Federal Rules.233 Thus, the judges' conclusion appears to be that because
initial disclosure has succeeded on the federal level, the same will happen on
the state level.234
F.

West Virginia's JudiciaryHas Spoken

Twelve of fifteen judges, or eighty percent, of the judges in West
Virginia that responded recommend that the West Virginia Rules be amended
to include initial disclosure. Eleven of fifteen judges, or seventy-three percent,
recommend that initial disclosure provisions in the West Virginia Rules should
mimic Federal Rule 26(a). The one judge who supports the rule being amended
into the West Virginia Rules but who opposes the rule mimicking the Federal
Rule 26(a) suggests that the rule should be closely tailored to state court needs.
The reasons given to support initial disclosure mirror the reasons for which
initial disclosure requirements were created-reducing cost and delay and
increasing efficiency-and the reasons for which the West Virginia Rules were
created-uniformity with the Federal Rules and efficiency. Without criticizing
initial disclosure rules, the judges who oppose initial disclosure only say that
the current West Virginia Rules are satisfactory. Therefore, based on the
responses, judges from across the state definitively support the West Virginia
Rules being amended to include initial disclosure provisions.235

See supra Part IV (discussing studies that mention problems of judges not enforcing initial
disclosure).
229
Questionnaires from Evan Olds, supra note 168.
230
See id
228

231
232
233
234
235

See id
See id.
See id.
See id.; infra Appendix 3.
See infra Appendix 3.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The West Virginia Rules should follow the Federal Rules because the
West Virginia Rules should once again comport with the trend and purpose of
the Federal Rules.236 The Federal Rules were created in 1938 to establish a
uniform set of rules under which courts nationwide could operate, and since
then, the trend of the Federal Rules has moved toward requiring disclosure and
uniformity, which is exemplified in the current initial disclosure rule. In 1960,
the West Virginia Rules were enacted to mimic the Federal Rules and thus
follow the "modem and generally accepted standards of procedure." 23 7 The
Federal Rules have followed the course of efficiency through uniformity and
full disclosure to decrease cost and delay, and the West Virginia Rules should
do the same.
Not only has the initial disclosure rule been shown to work, but also
judges in West Virginia want the rule. 2 38 Federal judges, who have dealt with
initial disclosure, laud its effects of decreasing cost and delay and recommend
amending the West Virginia Rules to include it. 2 39 State judges who have either
never dealt with initial disclosure or have dealt with it in a localized, de facto
form laud its effects as the federal judges do.240 When the West Virginia
Supreme Court Advisory Committee recommended to the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia to exclude the initial disclosure rule from the West
Virginia Rules, it intended to eventually revisit the rules. Now is the time to
revisit the rules, to realign with the federal trend of requiring disclosure, to
respond to West Virginia judges' recommendations, and to incorporate Rule
26(a) into the West Virginia Rules.
Evan Olds*

236

See LUGAR & SILVERSTEIN, supra note 66, at viii, 214.

237

Id. at viii.
See infra Appendix 3.
id.

238
239
240

Id.

*
Executive Notes Editor, Volume 115 of the West Virginia Law Review; J.D. Candidate,
West Virginia University College of Law, 2013; B.A. in English, cum laude, Concord
University, 2009. 1 would like to thank my family for their love and support. I would also like to
thank my Note Advisor, Professor Charles DiSalvo, for his invaluable insight and guidance,
Professor James Heiko for his statistical advice, my colleagues on the West Virginia Law Review
for their substantive and technical assistance, and the judges whose feedback made this Note
possible. Any errors contained herein are mine alone.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012

33

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 115, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 15

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

396

[Vol. 115

APPENDICES
Appendix 1
1.

Do you require Rule 26 initial disclosure or some other form of
involuntary disclosure in your court?
If so, do you do so by local rule or order?
If you do require disclosure by local rule or order, please quote
the rule here:
If you do not require disclosure by local rule or order, would
you please describe the disclosure requirements in your court?

2.

If you do require initial disclosure, what information or
materials do you require to be disclosed? If this information is
given in the first question, you do not have to answer this
question.

3.

Has initial disclosure made the trial process in your court more
efficient?
Please explain how disclosure has made the trial process more
or less effective in your court here:
What other effects has disclosure had on cases in your court?

4.

What are the strengths and weaknesses of the initial disclosure
rules?
Do you recommend that the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure be amended to include provisions for initial
disclosure?
Why or why not?

5.

If you do think that West Virginia state courts should adopt
initial disclosure, should West Virginia's initial disclosure rule
mimic the federal initial disclosure rule?

6.

Please add any additional comments here:
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Appendix 2

1.

Do you require any other form of involuntary disclosure in
your court?
If you do require some other form of initial disclosure in your
court, would you please describe the initial disclosure
requirements in your court?

2.

Were you sitting as a judge before 1993 when initial disclosure
became mandatory?
If so, has the change made your court more efficient or less
efficient?
Would you please describe how the change has affected your
court?

3.

If the following information is given in the previous question,
you do not have to answer this question.
Has initial disclosure made your court more efficient?
Please explain how initial disclosure has made the trial process
more or less effective in your court here:
What other effects has initial disclosure had on cases in your
court?

4.

If the following information is given in question #2, you do not
have to answer this question.
Do you think your court would be more efficient without initial
disclosure?
Would you please explain why or why not?
Do you think your court would be more efficient with more
initial disclosure?
Would you please explain why or why not?
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What are the strengths and weaknesses of the initial disclosure
rules?
Do you recommend that the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure be amended to include provisions for initial
disclosure?
Would you please explain why or why not?

6.

If you do think that West Virginia state courts should adopt
initial disclosure, should West Virginia's initial disclosure rule
mimic the federal initial disclosure rule?

7.

Please add any additional comments here:

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss1/15
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